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Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 4 December 1990, the General Assembly adopted resolution 45/65, entitled "Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", paragraphs 1 to 7 of which read as follows:

> "The General Assembly,
>
> "...
>
> "1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General;
>
> "2. Notes that the report was approved by the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to Undertake a Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification;
>
> "3. Commends the report to the attention of Member States;
>
> "4. Requests the Secretary-General to give the report the widest possible circulation;
>
> "5. Also requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate action within available resources on the recommendations of the Group;
>
> "6. Encourages Member States to give active consideration to the recommendations contained in the concluding chapter of the report and to assist the Secretary-General in their implementation where appropriate;
>
> "7. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session on actions taken by Member States and by the United Nations Secretariat to implement these recommendations".

II. ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

2. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Secretariat has undertaken several steps towards implementing the recommendations of the report of the Secretary-General containing the study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (A/45/372 and Corr.1).

3. Among the recommendations made by the Group of Experts was the development of a United Nations "consolidated data bank of published materials and data provided on a voluntary basis by Member State on all aspects of verification and compliance". The Group of Experts, in recommending the establishment of such a database, underlined the useful role that the United Nations can play "in making research and data related to cooperative arrangements and verification available to wider audiences".

4. In this connection, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has undertaken to develop a consolidated data collection of published materials on verification and compliance, as a separate part of its reference library. The data collection is a result of materials compiled by the Office, as provided on a voluntary basis by Member States, as well as freely donated by private sources. To that end, in order further to encourage Member States to participate actively in the development of the data collection, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has specifically contacted a number of Member States that are known to be particularly active in the field of verification and requested them to consider providing the Office with information, openly available, that might be added to the data collection. In addition, the former members of the Group of Experts that assisted the Secretary-General in carrying out the study were individually approached with a view to obtaining the assistance of their Governments as well.

5. To date, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has established a modest data collection. As suggested in the report, the collection includes some of the history of negotiations and treaty compliance; information on various procedures for verification and monitoring; data on techniques and instrumentation for verification and monitoring; and bibliographic information and data, including information relating to the Biological Weapons Convention and the future chemical weapons convention. In addition, it is planned to compile lists of contacts and experts on verification and addresses of institutions, organizations, companies and individuals who can provide expertise, technologies and advice on aspects of verification. These lists will be stored in the computerized database currently under implementation in the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

6. The Group of Experts also recommended that the United Nations play a constructive role in promoting exchanges between experts and diplomats to help the latter to address negotiating problems and to help experts focus on needed solutions. In this connection, it recommended that the Office for Disarmament Affairs promote workshops, seminars and training programmes on verification and compliance. While taking into account the limitations of existing resources, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has nevertheless made every effort to implement this recommendation by including the subject of verification in several of its regional Conferences and in its publications.

7. Thus, at the United Nations Seminar on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures organized at Vienna by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in cooperation with the Government of Austria in February 1991, the question of verification of compliance with the provisions of various confidence- and security-building measures was discussed among other topics. The presentations made at that seminar were later published as Topical Paper No. 7.

8. In May 1991, the Department for Disarmament Affairs organized at Kyoto, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, a conference on the challenges to multilateral disarmament in the post-cold-war and post-Gulf-war period, during which participants examined problems arising from the implementation of disarmament measures as one of the topics of the meeting. In the framework of

the discussions, special attention was paid to the future of monitoring and verification. The papers presented at the Kyoto conference were published as Topical Paper No. 8.

9. In addition to the above publications, an issue of Disarmament, a periodic review of the United Nations (vol. XIV, No. 2, 1991), was published dealing primarily with different aspects of verification such as the role of the United Nations in disarmament; experiences in the development of verification at the bilateral level; opportunities and constraints of multilateral verification; the question of verification concerning the Biological Weapons Convention; and verification regarding the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Other issues of Disarmament also included articles that addressed the issue of verification within a broader context. Furthermore, three studies carried out by the Secretary-General that dealt either entirely or partially with the question of verification were published in the Study Series and a fact sheet containing a summary of the study on verification was issued. 1/

10. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has also provided active support to the Geneva negotiations on a chemical weapons convention and the exchanges of information envisaged in the confidence-building measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. Most recently the Office was requested to assist the work of the Ad Hoc Group on Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint established on the basis of the Final Document of the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention.

III. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

11. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 45/65, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 27 February 1992, requested Member States to provide him with the relevant information mentioned therein. To date, the Secretary-General has received replies from Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are reproduced below. Any further replies will be issued as addenda to the present report.

CANADA

[Original: English]

[6 July 1992]

1. During the last decade, Canada has played a particularly active role in the United Nations consideration of the issue of verification in all its aspects, including the study conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts on the role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification. The Group's report constitutes perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative treatment

of the United Nations involvement in verification, and of multilateral verification in general. Over the coming years, the chapters exploring the underlying generic, conceptual and technical aspects of verification may well prove to be particularly useful, as the absence of an agreed survey of this material has long contributed to misunderstandings of the terms and concepts involved.

2. Since the conclusion of the Group's study, there have been many changes in the international political environment. World leaders have declared that the cold war is over. A "new world order" has emerged, characterized by increased multilateral cooperation in the security field, including on arms control and disarmament matters.

3. While acknowledging these extraordinarily positive changes in international relations, it is important to appreciate their boundaries. It would be erroneous to see the end of the cold war as also the end of concerns about security and the necessity of concluding meaningful agreements to control and reduce armaments, particularly as regards the possible proliferation of weapons. Canada believes that there will be a continuing requirement to pursue such agreements bilaterally, regionally and globally.

4. As long as arms control and disarmament agreements are important, and this seems likely to be true for the foreseeable future, it is essential that they be effectively verified. Indeed, as military forces come down in size, practical security requirements such as verification do not go away. Indeed, reliable verification may well become even more important because the impact of cheating in small amounts will be more significant than in the days of massive forces.

5. In the words endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly in resolution 43/81 B of 7 December 1988, "adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements". This is equally true today as it was in the past; verification is not an East-West issue that has died with the cold war.

6. The Group of Experts in their report defined verification succinctly as "a process which establishes whether the States parties are complying with their obligations under an agreement". As long as countries rely, even partially, for their security on obligations contained in arms control agreements, there will be a requirement for verification. This is not to suggest that verification need be adversarial or confrontational. Indeed, one of the more positive aspects of the "new world order" is the increased emphasis on multilateral cooperation, including in verification matters.

7. Put another way, verification is not simply a matter of substituting concrete evidence for blind trust. Nor is it a matter of providing some sort of "police" function. Rather, verification should be seen as one dimension of a common institution-building process. It should help meet the need to institutionalize, in the context of relations among States, the kind of accepted rules, procedures and expectations that govern the conduct of

relations among individuals in all civilized societies. Such rules and procedures do not presume bad faith or malevolent intent on the part of others, but they allow for such a possibility and provide a framework in which unjustified accusations could be authoritatively rebutted, misunderstandings clarified and resolved, and non-compliance objectively established.

8. The world is in the process of truly great changes. These changes have so far been characterized by a new-found willingness by many countries to cooperate on security-related matters and to reduce and control armaments. It is to be hoped that this ethos will continue. However, it would be unwise to assume this; indeed, world history would seem to suggest otherwise. Now would seem to be the time, when the will towards multilateral cooperation is strong, to build procedures and structures that can help assuage tensions should they rise again. Arms control verification is one way to accomplish this. The intentions of Governments can change relatively quickly; military capability much less so. But if appropriate verification procedures are in place, intentions can be clarified and capabilities made more evident. In the best environment, adequate and effective verification can help build and maintain confidence between nations; in the worst environment, it can facilitate the taking of the necessary steps to protect national security when non-compliance becomes evident.

9. There is an important role in this endeavour for international organizations, including the United Nations, as outlined in the Group of Experts' report. Canada continues to share this view and believes that new dimensions for such a role in the field of verification are emerging.

Data collection capability

10. Among the recommendations of the Group of Experts' report was the development of a United Nations "consolidated data bank of published materials and data provided on a voluntary basis by Member States on all aspects of verification and compliance". The Group of Experts, in recommending the establishment of such a database, underlined the useful role that the United Nations can play "in making research and data related to cooperative arrangements and verification available to wider audiences".

11. During the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, as part of Canada's ongoing commitment to assisting the United Nations in developing a practical and useful role in the field of verification, Canada presented to the United Nations a detailed Bibliography on Arms Control Verification covering more than 1,500 entries between the years 1962 to 1991. While not pretending to be exhaustive, this bibliography attempts to cover publications and submissions from Governments and international organizations as well as the research community's literature on the subject. It also includes a detailed subject index. The database from which this bibliography is drawn is computerized to facilitate subject searches. Canada was, therefore, able to provide the bibliography to the United Nations in electronically readable form as well as in hard copy. To assist officials, diplomats and researchers in their work on this subject, Canada also distributed a hard-copy version of the bibliography widely to libraries across Canada and around the world.

12. Canada urges other Member States of the United Nations with relevant experience in the field of verification to make similar contributions. The usefulness of the United Nations consolidated data bank will be determined, in large measure, by the support it receives from Member States.

13. In Canada's view, further dimensions to a United Nations role in the creation of verification databases, such as registers of qualified experts, and the exchange of information, including operational verification data, will continue to evolve. In this regard, the recently established United Nations global arms register is noteworthy. This register may well provide important input for future verification-related activities.

Exchanges between experts and diplomats

14. The Group of Experts recommended that the United Nations play a constructive role in promoting exchanges between experts and diplomats to help the latter to address negotiating problems and to help experts focus on needed solutions. Canada believes that there is a useful role that nations as well as the United Nations itself can play in this regard. For example, on a national basis and in cooperation with other countries, Canada has organized a number of international meetings of experts and diplomats focusing on arms control verification matters. Many of these relate to specific arms control agreements or negotiations, such as a recent Workshop on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Verification for Successor States of the Soviet Union organized with the collaboration of the Netherlands. Canada has also participated in a variety of United Nations-sponsored meetings on verification, notably several research projects sponsored by UNIDIR.

Role of the Secretary-General in fact-finding and other activities

15. In this context, the recent activities of the United Nations Special Commission are of particular note. On 3 April 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), which outlined the terms of a cease-fire for the Persian Gulf war and imposed stringent restrictions upon Iraq. These restrictions related to the destruction or removal, under international supervision, of all chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related facilities. Iraq was required to renounce in perpetuity the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and to submit to a stringent verification regime to ensure compliance.

16. To facilitate the verification of Iraqi compliance and to organize the destruction or removal of the proscribed material, the Security Council established the United Nations Special Commission. In the nuclear area, the Special Commission shares these functions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

17. The practical in-country inspection and destruction experience of the Special Commission and IAEA has been truly impressive. Within the first year of operations, in concert with IAEA, which leads on nuclear inspections, the

Special Commission initiated or participated in 31 major on-site inspection in Iraq (11 nuclear, 8 chemical, 9 ballistic missile, 3 biological). There have been over 700 inspection personnel deployments comprising nearly 400 individual inspection personnel from more than 34 different nationalities. The accumulated inspection experience is potentially precedent-setting in terms of the multilateral verification process.

18. A rough estimate of the Special Commission's costs is approximately $40 million up to 31 December 1991. It's high-altitude airborne imaging support, provided by a member nation, and the continued operation of two C160 Transall aircraft plus three CH-53 helicopters in support of on-site inspection operations constitute other significant expenditures.

19. Since the creation of the Special Commission in early 1991, Canadians have participated in inspections in all four weapons categories. Canada's representative on the Special Commission itself participated in the initial nuclear inspection lead by IAEA at the Iraqi nuclear research facility at Tuwaitha in May 1991. Canadians have also held senior positions in the Special Commission and on various inspections. In all, Canadians have constituted approximately 5 per cent of the inspection personnel deployments.

20. Although the Special Commission experience is of relatively short duration and its responsibilities are the product of a concise Security Council resolution (and not the result of a prolonged negotiation), there are a number of initial lessons to be learned that have a direct application to multilateral negotiations such as CFE (a regional agreement) and the chemical weapons convention (CWC) (an agreement with global dimensions), as well as to the improvement of IAEA safeguards. There are striking similarities, particularly in terms of process and procedure from the accumulation of baseline data, through the reduction/destruction phase, to the problems related to future compliance. Experience respecting challenge inspections, no-notice inspections, routine inspections, declared sites, undeclared sites are relevant to CFE, CWC and other areas.

21. The United Nations Secretariat has made an important contribution to the success of the Special Commission's verification activities. While the Special Commission is unique and not foreseen by the United Nations Group of Experts' study, it is quite possible that other verification-related activities may be authorized by the Security Council in the future. In this way the United Nations may well make further significant contributions to the verification of arms limitation and disarmament.

Use of aircraft for verification purposes

22. The Group of Experts did not make any specific recommendation with regard to the use of aircraft for verification. It should be noted, however, that since the time of their report the relevance of aerial surveillance for verification-related activities has been highlighted by two important developments. First, the Special Commission has made use of high-resolution aerial imagery provided by Member States. In addition, helicopters are

employed during on-site inspections as an aerial platform for hand-held photography. Second, the Open Skies Treaty was signed on 24 March 1992 by 25 countries, including Canada. This agreement establishes a regime for the conduct of observation flights by the parties over each other's territories in Europe and North America. This Treaty is to be registered with the United Nations.

23. As in other contexts, any role for the United Nations with regard to the use of aircraft for verification purposes will depend on the wishes of the parties to the applicable agreements.

Use of satellites

24. Satellites, as noted in the Group of Experts' report, have played a key role in verifying arms control and disarmament agreements and will continue to do so in the future. It is noteworthy that there appear to be movements recently in Europe to develop a multilateral satellite capability relevant to arms control verification.

Towards an international verification system

25. Canada shares the view of the Group of Experts that the development of a United Nations verification organization should continue to be the subject of consideration as the international political environment changes. Canada, however, continues to have concerns about the rationale for an immediate start-up of such an "umbrella" verification body. In contrast, there are much stronger reasons to support multilateral verification (including a role for international organizations) in narrower contexts. It would be more productive at present, perhaps, to consider issue-specific verification organizations or region-specific verification organizations as options. Again, the creation and involvement of such international organizations, including any United Nations role, is a matter that requires the consent of the parties of the relevant arms control agreements.

Conclusion

26. When designing future arms control and disarmament agreements, parties should actively consider the role that the United Nations or its associated organizations could play in facilitating the verification process. The United Nations is unique in its global scope, its membership and its Charter, as the Group of Experts' report points out. It can bring to bear considerable expertise both from within its own structure and through contributions from its Member States.

27. Canada believes that as a result of the radical changes internationally in the last two years, the United Nations may have an increasingly useful role to play in arms control verification beyond the parameters outlined in the Group of Experts' report. The Security Council's role in this field is likely to take on an important new dimension as evidenced by the advent of the Special Commission. Given the continuance of a dynamic Security Council, it

seems quite possible that there may be significant future opportunities for the United Nations in multilateral verification.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: English]

[22 June 1992]

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic welcomes the possibility to participate in the Office for Disarmament Affairs' endeavours to develop a consolidated data collection of published materials on all aspects of verification and compliance. To fulfil this aim, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent letters to all Czechoslovak ministries and institutions involved, asking them to provide it with the appropriate materials. After their receipt, they will be sent to the Office for Disarmament Affairs for further utilization.

FRANCE

[Original: French]

[14 July 1992]

Conclusion and recommendation A

France's contribution to the collection of data on verification undertaken by the United Nations

1. France is a party to the following arms control agreements that have provisions for a verification system:

(a) The 1992 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-building Measures (CSBMs), in effect since 1 May 1992;

(b) The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed on 19 November 1991, which has not yet entered into force but already serves as the framework for trial inspections organized under ad hoc bilateral arrangements;

(c) For reference, the Treaty on Open Skies, signed on 24 March 1992, which has not yet entered into force and which is dealt with under a separate heading.

2. The Document on CSBMs and the CFE Treaty are limited in scope on two counts: first, geographically because they are regional agreements whose area of application extends from the Atlantic to the Urals or, in the case of CSBMs, to Central Asia as well; and secondly, because of the weapons they

cover (part of the conventional armaments of land and air forces). Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and naval force matériel do not therefore fall within their scope.

3. It should be noted that the United Nations plays no role in the CSBM and CFE processes.

4. Both the Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty establish a system of verification based on annual exchanges of information and specific notifications regarding weapons holdings (CFE, CSBMs) and military activities (CSBMs), whose accuracy can be checked by inspecting selected units or zones.

5. Such inspections can be conducted only within the limits of the passive quotas assigned to each country.

The Vienna Document

6. The 1992 Vienna Document applies to all the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (numbering 52 to date). It is part of the CSCE process.

7. Already in the Helsinki Final Act (1975) there was provision for a series of confidence- and security-building measures.

8. In 1983, the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE established the Conference on Disarmament in Europe with the task of undertaking negotiations on the adoption of new confidence- and security-building measures that would be militarily meaningful and politically binding and provide for adequate forms of verification. Such measures were intended to increase transparency in the military sphere.

9. The CSBMs thus agreed upon were consolidated in the Stockholm Document (1986).

10. They were subsequently supplemented and expanded upon by further CSBMs together with which they formed the 1990 Vienna Document. The latter has now been superseded following the adoption by the CSCE States of the 1992 Vienna Document, which again incorporates new CSBMs.

11. The CSCE States also agreed in 1990 to establish a CSBM data bank, to be administered by the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna.

The CFE Treaty

12. The CFE Treaty was signed on 19 November 1990 by 22 States (16 NATO countries, 6 Warsaw Pact countries). The list of States parties increased to 29 countries with the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

13. The CFE Treaty pursues a broader objective than the transparency sought by the conclusion of successive CSBM documents. It imposes collective and

national ceilings on the armed forces of the signatory States within the area of application, in five categories of equipment (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, pieces of artillery, attack helicopters, combat aircraft). This target is to be met by the destruction, according to agreed procedures, of any equipment above the ceilings. The CFE Treaty also establishes a sufficiency rule, which limits to 30 per cent the share of overall authorized forces that any single State party may possess and rules of stability (establishment of regional sub-ceilings, storage of a certain proportion of equipment).

14. It was in the course of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE (1989) that it was decided to launch negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. The negotiations began in March 1989 and concluded in November 1990 with the signing of the Treaty at the Paris Meeting of the CSCE.

Verification systems

15. The verification authorized by the Vienna Document can be conducted according to two different procedures. It can take the form either of an inspection designed to monitor, within a specified zone, the level of troops engaged in a military exercise, or of an evaluation visit designed to verify the armament and troop levels of a selected unit.

16. The Protocol on Inspection annexed to the CFE Treaty describes four methods of verification:

(a) Inspection of an "object of verification", which takes place within a unit or a storage area holding armaments limited by the Treaty. Such an inspection enables a State party to verify the accuracy of data furnished by the inspected State on the equipment holdings of the object of verification;

(b) Inspection of a "specified area", in which a team of inspectors covers a maximum area of 65 square kilometres in order to satisfy itself that no undeclared armaments limited by the Treaty are being held;

(c) Inspection of "certification" and inspection of "reduction", in which the destruction or conversion of equipment exceeding the ceilings authorized by the Treaty is verified.

17. Pursuant to the Stockholm Document and, subsequently, the 1990 and 1992 Vienna Documents on CSBMs, France has conducted two inspections (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and six evaluation visits (USSR, Romania, Bulgaria, Russian Federation, Hungary, Czechoslovakia), while it has undergone two inspections (USSR) and two evaluation visits (USSR, Russian Federation).

Bodies responsible for verification

18. Three bodies in France have particular responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the Document on CSBMs and the CFE Treaty.

19. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Strategic Affairs Department set up its own Verification Unit on 1 July 1991.

20. At the Ministry of Defence, responsibility for verification of arms control agreements rests with the Arms Control Division of the Armed Forces General Staff and with an inter-forces body under its supervision, the French Verification Unit, which is responsible for conducting French inspections and for accompanying foreign inspectors in France.

Conclusion and recommendation D

Measures taken by France regarding the use of aircraft for verification purposes

21. On 24 March 1992, France, together with 24 other participating States of the CSCE, signed the Treaty on Open Skies.

22. Main provisions of the Treaty:

(a) Under this Treaty, the signatory States shall have the right to conduct flights over the territory of other States parties and shall be obliged to accept flights over their own territories. Such observation flights shall be conducted by unarmed aircraft equipped with agreed sensors (optical, video, infra-red and radar) and shall be subject to annual quotas (active and passive quotas).

(b) States wishing to do so may form a group of States parties.

(c) The entire territory of States parties shall be open to observation flights. The data recorded must be communicated to the observed party and shall be made available to other States parties.

(d) The observation flights provided for under the Treaty on Open Skies may be used for purposes other than the strict application of the Treaty: to safeguard the environment and as an instrument for conflict prevention and crisis management on behalf of the CSCE.

23. Political impact of the Treaty on Open Skies:

(a) The Open Skies Treaty will contribute effectively to the verification of disarmament agreements: aerial observation will supplement the land inspection provided for, inter alia, in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (inspections of the "declared-site" or "challenge" type).

(b) The Open Skies Treaty can be viewed also as an instrument for transparency and confidence-building: the opening of the entire territory of States parties is particularly significant in this respect.

(c) Lastly, the Open Skies Treaty is intended for incorporation with the new provisions on conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-keeping currently being worked out within the CSCE.

Conclusion and recommendation E

Measures taken by France regarding the use of satellites for verification purposes

24. In this area, France has drafted proposals for several types of measures that have been presented formally at the United Nations or in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space of the Conference on Disarmament. The French authorities are in favour of the use of space to verify arms control or disarmament agreements but continue to believe that only States parties to a treaty have the right to verify its implementation. This said, the initiatives taken by France remain valid and, in this connection, the French Arms Control and Disarmament Plan of 3 June 1991 reaffirmed that space activities should not be carried on in isolation from the disarmament process and could contribute to security and transparency.

25. The main proposals made by France are, briefly, as follows:

(a) Creation of an international satellite monitoring agency (first special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, 1978), with the twofold function of permanent verification of disarmament agreements and occasional assistance to the United Nations in crisis management.

(b) Establishment of an agency for the processing and interpretation of space images (third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, 1988).

(c) Willingness to consider confidence-building measures in space, the aim being to increase transparency and confidence in space activities and to set up regional agencies for transparency that could take advantage of satellite data to contribute, along the lines of the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, to crisis management and conflict prevention.

GERMANY

[Original: English]

[27 July 1992]

1. With reference to General Assembly resolution 45/62 F concerning implementation of United Nations guidelines on CBM, the European Community Member States have submitted to the Secretary-General comprehensive information on, inter alia, verification measures under the provisions governing confidence- and security-building in the Vienna Document 1990/1992. The following information does not, therefore, elaborate in detail on this information but rather adds some complementary aspects from a national perspective.

2. Resolution 45/65, entitled "Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", which was adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December 1990, encourages Member States to give active consideration to the recommendations contained in the concluding chapter of the report and requests information on actions taken by Member States in this respect.

3. From an early stage, Germany has attached great importance to verification as a key instrument for ensuring compliance with agreements on disarmament and arms control, for building confidence and enhancing security.

4. In the period from late 1990 until the present, the following activities have been undertaken or started with the cooperation or on the initiative of Germany:

(a) Concerning the implementation of the Vienna Document 1990/1992 (see sect. 2 of the report of the European Community member States), Germany has, since 1 July 1992 when the provisions on evaluation became effective, conducted eight evaluation visits in other CSCE participating States. Other participating States conducted a total of six evaluation visits on German territory, of which two were visits to German forces and four were visits to forces of stationing States. Furthermore, in July 1992, Germany arranged a visit for representatives of all other participating States to one of its airbases.

(b) In implementation of the INF Treaty concluded between the United States of America and the Soviet Union (see sect. 2 of the report of the European Community member States), which provided for the destruction of an entire class of nuclear weapons under comprehensive verification measures, if inspections by parties to the Treaty took place on German territory from December 1990 to the present time in order to verify the elimination of these weapons. Inspections within the framework of this treaty may continue until 2001.

(c) Germany is already participating in "international cooperation in the development of verification procedures and technology" (para. 267 of the United Nations report):

(i) It plays an active role in furthering a comprehensive and effective verification regime for the forthcoming chemical weapons convention;

(ii) In March 1992, it organized an international brainstorming seminar on the complex problem of verification in the field of biological weapons; this exercise helped to prepare the first meeting of experts on this subject at Geneva (March/April 1992);

(iii) German experts are involved in the work of the group of scientific experts for verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban;

(iv) During the annual visit to Germany of a group of United Nations disarmament fellows, the Federal Government provides comprehensive information on verification, which often includes a visit to a site where chemical weapons are being eliminated (see para. 268 of the United Nations report);

(v) In 1990, the Federal Government lent financial support to the UNIDIR project on new technical means for the verification of arms control.

(d) At present, the Federal Government is preparing a "roster of experts and organizations to whom questions could be addressed and with whom verification research projects could be discussed" (para. 262 of the United Nations report). After finalization, this list will be at the disposal of the United Nations Secretariat and of all interested Member States.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]

[4 June 1992]

1. The United Kingdom carefully monitors the academic and governmental literature on arms control verification, especially on chemical and biological weapons. At a suitable future date, the United Kingdom would be prepared to submit a bibliography of such materials, which would include governmental papers and reports where appropriate.

2. With regard to the other proposals of the Secretary-General's report on this subject, the United Kingdom is ready to advise the Secretariat as and when required, and to consider offering assistance on a case-by-case basis and as resources allow.

Notes

1/ Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.IX.11); Effective and Verifiable Measures Which Would Facilitate the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.IX.14); South Africa's Nuclear-tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.IX.23); The Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification (Disarmament Facts, Number 72).